The South African Navy Valour-class frigate SAS AmatolaSouth African National Defence Force/Boitumelo Chouene
Isel van Zyl, Timothy Walker – Published on 02 Jun 2026, 8:54 pm
Since late 2023, Houthi attacks in the Red Sea have forced many vessels bound for the Suez Canal and Bab el-Mandeb to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope. The longer instability concerning passage through the Bab el-Mandeb strait persists, the more the cape route risks becoming embedded in global shipping practice rather than remaining a temporary contingency. This has restored South Africa to a position of real relevance in global maritime trade.
But South Africa remains underprepared to capitalise on this renewed importance. Despite possessing a coastline of nearly 2,800 kilometres and an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) exceeding 1.5 million square kilometres, the country struggles to adequately monitor and protect these waters.
South Africa’s recent renewed maritime relevance is colliding with fiscal constraints, deteriorating infrastructure, and the absence of a coherent national maritime strategy. South Africa’s maritime future depends on whether Pretoria can secure its own maritime frontier, modernise its ports, protect its EEZ, and translate its geographic advantage into long-term economic and strategic resilience.
Illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, environmental crimes, smuggling, and trafficking remain persistent challenges. Greater maritime surveillance and patrol capacity is needed to ensure any gaps in South Africa’s maritime domain are not left vulnerable to exploitation by illegal fishing vessels.
These vulnerabilities are becoming more concerning as maritime traffic around the cape increases. The rerouting of vessels around the Cape of Good Hope has placed additional strain on already overburdened South African ports such as Durban, Cape Town and Ngqura. Durban and Cape Town continue to face operational inefficiencies, infrastructure deterioration, congestion, and logistical delays that undermine South Africa’s ability to benefit economically from its strategic geographic position.
The navy faces severe fiscal and operational constraints that undermine its ability to fulfil even its most basic coastal and maritime protection functions.
South Africa devotes considerable political attention to multinational naval exercises and symbolic maritime diplomacy. The January 2026 Exercise Will for Peace, hosted alongside China, Russia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates, was intended as an exercise in maritime security cooperation, yet reports of command and interoperability challenges raised questions about South Africa’s priorities and operational readiness.
This is not to suggest that its naval diplomacy lacks value. South Africa has long benefited from diversified maritime partnerships through exercises including IBSAMAR with India and Brazil, ATLASUR in the South Atlantic, and Exercise Good Hope with Germany. Recent highlights include participation in India’s Exercise MILAN and the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium. The first deployment since 2008 of a South African naval vessel to the Pacific Ocean similarly reflects the country’s continued commitment to maritime multilateralism and non-alignment.
Symbolic maritime success aside, its ability to sustain such missions – and to maintain domestic maritime patrols and presence – has come into question.
Typically, South Africa can fully deploy one frigate and one submarine at any given time. South Africa’s navy faces severe fiscal and operational constraints that undermine its ability to fulfil even its most basic coastal and maritime protection functions. Defence expenditure has steadily declined in real terms and now sits at roughly 0.8 per cent of GDP, while maintenance backlogs continue to limit the operational availability of major naval platforms.
The growing strains on maritime patrol capabilities are visible in declining sea hours and delayed refits. Although the introduction of Warrior-class inshore patrol vessels should improve coastal presence, they could struggle to fully protect South Africa’s EEZ or address the broader challenges affecting South Africa’s maritime security architecture.
More departments, private-sector stakeholders, and regional partners need to buy into Operation Phakisa’s broader vision of maritime governance and economic security.
South Africa needs to reassess how limited naval capacity can be better utilised protecting domestic waters, fisheries, shipping lanes, and critical maritime infrastructure. Clarifying the future of Operation Copper – South Africa’s long-standing anti-piracy deployment in the Mozambique Channel – is essential. Initially launched in response to the Somali piracy crisis in 2011, the operation continues to absorb planning and budgetary attention despite no South African naval vessel being deployed to the area since 2022.
South Africa’s core maritime problem is one of fragmentation. Multiple departments retain maritime responsibilities, including the navy, the Department of Forestry, Fisheries and the Environment, Transnet, customs authorities, and the Border Management Authority. Yet coordination remains weak.
While the government’s 2014 initiative to support national development, Operation Phakisa, identified the ocean economy as a national priority, implementation has remained uneven and largely ineffective. A national maritime security strategy has also been in the works since at least 2019, but has yet to be finalised.
What South Africa urgently requires is a coherent and fully implemented national maritime strategy that aligns with defence, foreign policy, environmental protection, border management, port governance, and economic development. More departments, private-sector stakeholders, and regional partners need to buy into Operation Phakisa’s broader vision of maritime governance and economic security.
The cape route is regaining prominence, whether Pretoria is prepared for it or not.
This story originally appeared on The Interpreter, published by the Lowy Institute for International Policy.
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