A Campaign Plan for the South China Sea Episodic presence is not counterinsurgency. By Captain Joshua Taylor, U.S. Navy August 2022 Proceedings Vol. 148/8/1,434

The current U.S. approach to China’s maritime insurgency is succinctly characterized as episodic high-end presence. Ongoing freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) and intermittent challenges to the most blatant instances of maritime coercion typify this approach. Rather than reassuring allies and partners, however, these activities sometimes alarm them, because FONOPs raise concerns that the United States is disproportionately “militarizing” the situation by employing high-end assets to deter a low-end threat.1 Further undercutting U.S. efforts, allies and partners may perceive episodic presence as strategic unreliability, which feeds into China’s narrative that the United States is an undependable partner that stirs up trouble and then sails away. The solution to this paradox is to balance episodic high-end operations with persistent low-end presence to deter escalation, bolster partner nation capacity, and catalyze regional will to oppose China’s coercive maritime activities.

Though it is tempting to think the United States might somehow give its allies and partners a “magic bullet” that will provide them with the will and capability to stand up to Chinese maritime coercion on their own, history shows that this is exceedingly improbable. More FONOPs and/or one-off response options are not likely to change appreciably the behavior of Chinese paramilitary maritime forces either. China’s campaign to wrest control of the South China Sea goes back to at least 2013, and China has thus far successfully parried challenges to its unlawful behavior. As the “indispensable nation,” the United States must be present on the water all day, every day, 24/7/365, to lead a maritime counterinsurgency campaign.

The Outline of a Campaign

The new National Defense Strategy makes a cornerstone of campaigning, which joint doctrine defines as “a series of related operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space.”2 In contrast to operational or contingency plans, campaigns focus mostly on nonlethal operations, activities, and investments over time to further U.S. national security objectives in pursuit of a more favorable strategic environment. Campaigning is not a single operation, but multiple, mutually reinforcing efforts that seek to affect multiple adversary centers of gravity while bolstering those of allies and partners and protecting one’s own.

The 2020 triservice maritime strategy Advantage at Sea provides additional guidance to consider when developing a South China Sea campaign. Specifically, it charges the naval service to partner, persist, and prevail across the competition continuum, employing integrated all-domain naval power to advance global maritime security and governance, strengthen alliances and partnerships, confront and expose malign behavior, expand information and decision advantage, and deploy and sustain combat-credible forces.

Given national defense and Navy strategic direction, several objectives should guide a South China Sea campaign. First, regional allies and partners must be able to fully exercise sovereign maritime rights in accordance with international law and free from Chinese coercion.3 Second, allies and partners should over time be able to take the lead in maintaining the rules-based international order at sea. Third, China must be convinced to abandon its policy of maritime coercion to advance its illegitimate claims. Indeed, it is not so much China’s excessive claims that are the main issue, but the coercive actions Beijing takes to enforce them. Thus, a counterinsurgency campaign should focus on dissuading China or rendering its activities counterproductive to its strategic objectives. Fourth, the United States must maintain strategic credibility, build access, and position itself to deter and respond to Chinese escalation, while retaining significant diplomatic and military freedom of action in international waters.

In developing a South China Sea campaign plan, it is important to heed the advice of naval scholars who have studied this problem in depth. In their 2019 book China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations, Andrew Erickson and Ryan Martinson offer “options for the definitive use of U.S. sea power in the gray zone” and recommend bolstering the ability of allies and partners to assert their own maritime sovereign rights by sailing alongside them, rather than engaging in direct U.S. actions against Chinese paramilitary maritime forces. Specific suggestions for “definitive” actions include escorting fishing/resource exploration vessels, assisting with visit, board, search, and seizure activities, and prosecuting Chinese ships for poaching and conducting illegal activities. U.S. forces also should provide information, as well as nonlethal and lethal overwatch. A South China Sea campaign that translates these principles into action in a resource- and diplomatically constrained—but feasible and effective—manner should be organized around the following lines of effort and accompanying messages:

• Beat Cop. Persistent low-end presence—“The United States has skin in the game.”

• Neighborhood Watch. Build a regional coalition— “We are stronger together.”

• Vigilance. Information sharing—“We are always watching.”