The guided-missile destroyer USS Lassen (DDG-82) escorts the merchant vessel Mohawk through the Strait of Hormuz. – U.S. Navy (Michael H. Lehman)
CNO Naval History Essay Contest—First Prize
(Midshipmen/Cadets Category)—Sponsored by Drs. Jack and Jennifer London Charitable Foundation
The world’s premier Navy should be ensuring freedom of the seas for a robust U.S. merchant marine rather than mostly foreign commercial ships.
By Midshipman Second Class Brendan McGrew, U.S. Navy
June 2026
Proceedings – Vol. 152/6/1,480
The United States is not a sea power. Ancient Greek historians Thucydides and Herodotus defined thalassokratia, or “sea power,” as a state dominated by the sea in its identity and culture—and utterly dependent on it for survival.1 The historic sea powers of Athens, Carthage, Venice, and Great Britain linked their survival to their command of the waters around them. Their navies existed to preserve their use of the sea and to conduct limited wars meant to exhaust stronger opponents.
The United States, on the other hand, has looked inward for much of its history, acquiring land rather than trade routes. Part of the U.S. Navy’s mission is to project power, or to influence other countries—a hallmark not of a maritime power, but a continental one.2 When the United States ran out of frontier to absorb in the late 19th century, it funneled its industrial output into foreign trade. Alfred Thayer Mahan used this shift to justify the necessity of a powerful navy to a continental nation. Without a vibrant commercial sector, the need for and capability to own a navy evaporates.
Mahan advised that “a great population following callings related to the sea is a great element of sea power, that the United States is deficient in that element, and that its foundations can be laid only in a large commerce under her own flag.”3 Yet, in 2025, the U.S. Merchant Marine barely existed, ranking 22nd globally by tonnage.4 Here lies the disconnect with the modern U.S. Sea Services: The world’s premier naval fighting force ensures freedom of the seas mostly for foreign commercial shipping. To safeguard its economic resilience and national security in a contested global environment, the United States must again develop a capable merchant marine.
The Rise and Fall of the U.S. Merchant Marine
Understanding how the United States arrived at this point begins with a review of the Merchant Marine’s 20th century rise and decline. In the years leading up to World War I, an increasing share of U.S. goods was being shipped around the globe. However, the majority of this shipping took place on foreign-flagged vessels, most notably from Britain.
On the eve of the war, every British, French, and German ship was recalled to its home country, bringing U.S. exports to a near standstill. Goods began piling up on docks and in warehouses; the cost to ship one ton of cotton increased 17-fold overnight, from $0.35 to $6.10.5 Fortunately, thanks to a healthy coastal trade, the United States had shipyards that adjusted to and experienced sailors who quickly adapted to transoceanic voyages.
By 1918, War Department Shipping Board Chairman Edward Hurley had commandeered every shipyard in the country, every U.S.-flagged ship greater than 2,500 tons, and every German or Austrian ship detained in U.S. ports. To find sailors for his fleet, he enlisted the United Drug Company’s network of store clerks as recruiters, attracting 32,000 volunteers.6 Hurley had successfully averted a crisis, underscoring the strategic necessity of the Merchant Marine. Although his brilliance had helped save the nation, a shift in maritime policy was clearly needed.
That shift came in the form of the 1920 Merchant Marine Act, commonly known as the Jones Act. The landmark bill formally laid out the United States’ first cohesive maritime directive, explicitly stating that a well-equipped merchant marine of private U.S. citizens was “necessary for national defense and for the proper growth of foreign and domestic commerce.”7 Highlights from the act included placing new oil-fired ships on strategic routes to compete with Britain and granting a multitude of rights for merchant mariners, such as allowing them to leave a ship’s service despite the wording in predatory contracts. A 1936 addendum to the act offered low-interest loans to shipbuilders and handed out differential subsidies for ship construction and operation under the U.S. flag. With government support, the Merchant Marine fleet ballooned to more than 1,375 ships by the start of World War II.8
That war harshly tested the U.S. Merchant Marine, especially in the scramble of early 1942. Specifically, six Cimarron-class fast oilers shouldered the weight of supporting the entire Pacific Fleet while Admiral Chester W. Nimitz desperately tried to secure more tankers. Built under the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, the Cimarrons were intended for commercial use but still incorporated military features, such as twin propellers and underway replenishment capabilities. Although only six made it to the Pacific, they proved instrumental in keeping the rest of the fleet at sea.
The Battle of the Coral Sea in May 1942 was not just the first carrier-on-carrier action, but also the first time a carrier task force had to operate so far from a friendly base. A single oiler with 150,000 barrels of fuel was able to sustain the carrier force for nearly four weeks and then sprint home to refuel, thanks to its comparatively high speed.9 The Cimarrons also sustained fleets at Midway and Guadalcanal in the months that followed the Battle of the Coral Sea. Their design and immediate readiness after Pearl Harbor perfectly showcased the strategic value of investing in the Merchant Marine during peacetime; December 1941 would have been too late to lay down hulls for fast oilers.
At the U.S. Merchant Marine’s peak in 1945, the United States was the sole world power with intact shipyards, and it controlled a titanic share of the global shipping industry. Rather than retaining the products of the wartime surge, however, Congress passed the Merchant Ship Sales Act of 1946, choosing to sell 1,113 ships to allied nations to help rebuild their fleets. Shortly thereafter, the Merchant Marine shrank by 733 ships and almost 10,000 men.10 Domestically, the opening of oil pipelines and air travel decreased demand for the coastal trade that had traditionally been so robust. New open registries in Liberia and later the Marshall Islands gave shipping companies opportunities to avoid obligations in the United States. Finally, in 1981, Congress withdrew the construction and operation differentials from 1936, eliminating one of the last incentives for domestic production.11
With foreign commercial carriers costing businesses far less to move product, there were many who believed foreign ships and crews could be contracted to move military matériel in times of crisis. However, after President Lyndon Johnson committed troops to Vietnam in 1965, no foreign operator would sail to that country. Vietnam’s ports were notoriously slow and were not located on established shipping routes. Once again, U.S. merchant mariners stepped up, even resolving an ongoing strike to serve their country in a time of need.12 Yet, this did not halt the slide in the service’s capacity or capability.
A Readiness Crisis
Today, the U.S. Merchant Marine fleet stands at a mere 177 ships—lagging behind not just major competitors, but also small countries such as Vietnam.13 About 60 of these ships fall under the Maritime Security Program—in exchange for a yearly stipend, they are made available on the government’s request. In 2019, U.S. Transportation Command ran a sweeping turbo activation drill during which, without warning, it demanded more than 50 Maritime Security Program ships be readied for deployment, simulating an actual crisis. Only 41 percent of the ships were able to sail within the required time—well short of the expected 85 percent.14 In an emergency, the United States will depend on these ships to reach global hotspots, because there is no guarantee foreign carriers will agree to ferry U.S. military equipment.
If military sealift was strained during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm in 1990–91, which took place just 400 nautical miles from supply depots in Bahrain, the prospects are grim for a fight in the South China Sea, 1,700 nautical miles from Guam and almost 5,000 nm from Pearl Harbor.
In 2022, several shipping titans, including Maersk and Mediterranean Shipping Company, independently decided to sanction Russia, cutting off essential medical equipment and food.15 It is not difficult to imagine a scenario in which Maersk, a Danish company, might sanction the United States, which could be sealed out of maritime trade without even being the target of a blockade. The U.S. Navy and Coast Guard would dominate the seas with little challenge, but without shipping to escort. The only solution is a robust fleet of U.S.-flagged commercial vessels crewed by U.S. citizens.
China’s Maritime Ambition
Historically, China has not been a sea power. Its people do not long for the sea, and it shares long land borders with long-time adversaries such as Russia and Vietnam. Yet, its People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is bent on strategic dominance. Like the United States at the turn of the 20th century, China’s dependence on maritime trade has exploded in the past few decades. China now aims to replace the United States as the dominant power in the Indo-Pacific, and though its forces have proliferated at an astounding rate, the PLAN remains second to the U.S. Navy in tonnage, experience, and technology.
However, China far eclipses the United States in commercial shipping. China’s merchant registry numbers more than 5,500 ships—30 times greater than the current U.S. merchant fleet and larger even than the U.S. fleet during World War II. China also leads the global shipbuilding industry with a capacity of 23 million tons—232 times greater than that of the United States—and holds 75 percent of all current ship orders.16 Shanghai Zhenhua Heavy Industries, a Chinese state-owned corporation, builds 80 percent of the ship-to-shore container cranes used in the United States.17 This is a significant supply chain vulnerability.
In addition, Chinese President Xi Jinping pledged to pour another $40 billion into developing a “Maritime Silk Road” linking China with India and Southeast Asian nations.18 With Beijing holding such an outsized position in the commercial maritime sector, at present Mahan’s justifications for sea power apply more to the PLAN than to the U.S. Navy.
Much like in 1914, the United States finds itself heavily dependent on foreign-operated ships to transport its commerce. And it no longer has a coastal maritime industry to fall back on. If an emergency such as World War I occurred again, U.S. liquefied natural gas, containers, and grain exports would start piling up at the docks.
Solutions are within reach in a reasonable amount of time. To revitalize the Merchant Marine, a new Jones Act is needed—a true maritime strategy to nurture the U.S. commercial shipping sector through the rest of the 21st century. This should include exempting U.S.-flagged ships from paying tariffs and reinstating shipbuilding subsidies. Such financial incentives would encourage shipping companies to consider domestic alternatives to the current, mostly international, options.
Similarly, most large U.S. shipyards depend solely on military contracts, whose inconsistency results in an episodic exodus of skilled workers.19 Incorporating civilian projects would provide better job security and smooth out the employment cycle, giving shipyards a more experienced and stable workforce. Streamlining mariner licensing—an arduous procedure overseen by the Coast Guard—also could raise industry recruiting and retention rates. Finally, under a new strategy, the U.S. government must invest more in maritime academies and apprenticeship programs. A fresh wave of talent entering the workforce would fill critical mariner shortages and would be key to long-term competitiveness.
The Merchant Marine has proved time and again that it holds an integral place in national defense, from rapid sealift to a flow of experienced sailors and shipyard workers the Navy desperately needs. A rejuvenated Merchant Marine is essential for the United States to ensure the long-term security of its maritime interests.
1. Richard Connolly and Andrew Monaghan, The Sea in Russian Strategy (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2023).
2. Andrew Lambert, Seapower States: Maritime Culture, Continental Empires and the Conflict That Made the Modern World (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, March 2020).
3. Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783 (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1890).
4. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Review of Maritime Transport: Navigating Maritime Chokepoints (New York: United Nations Publications, 2024).
5. Salvatore R. Mercogliano, “A Century of the Jones Act,” Sea History Magazine 169 (Winter 2019–20).
6. Edward Hurley, The Bridge to France (Philadelphia, PA: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1927).
7. U.S. Government, “Merchant Marine Act of 1920,” 46 U.S.C. § 861.
8. “United States Maritime Commission, 1936 Thru 1950,” compiled by Frank A. Gerhardt, www.usmaritimecommission.de/.
9. Thomas Wildenberg, Gray Steel and Black Oil: Fast Tankers and Replenishment at Sea in the U.S. Navy, 1912–1992 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1996).
10. “U.S. Merchant Ships Sunk or Damaged in WWII,” American Merchant Marine at War, www.usmm.org/shipsunkdamaged.html.
11. Collin Grabow, “Subsidies and Misplaced Shipbuilding Nostalgia,” CATO Institute, 2 September 2021.
12. Lee Pressman, “Case Study in Labor-Management Relations: Maritime Industry–1965,” Boston College Law Review 7, no. 4 (July 1966).
13. Marcus Lu, “Ranked: The World’s Largest Merchant Ship Fleets by Country,” Visual Capitalist, 15 October 2025.
14. VADM Dee L. Mewbourne, USN, Turbo Activation 19-Plus After-Action Report (Scott AFB, IL: U.S. Transportation Command, December 2019).
15. Sam Meredith, “World’s Largest Shipping Companies Suspend Bookings to and from Russia,” CNBC, 3 March 2022.
16. Cathalijne Adams, “China’s Shipbuilding Capacity Is 232 Times Greater than that of the United States,” Alliance for American Manufacturing, 2023.
17. Hon. Mark E. Green et al., “Handling Our Cargo: How the People’s Republic of China Invests Strategically in the U.S. Maritime Industry,” U.S. House of Representatives Select Committee on the CCP, Majority Staff Report, September 2024.
18. Yamei, “Full Text of President Xi’s Speech at Opening of Belt and Road Forum,” Xinhuanet.com, 14 May 2017.
19. David Sharp, “The U.S. Navy’s Warship Production Is in Its Worst State in 25 Years. What’s Behind It?” AP News, 11 August 2024.
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