A postcard with a photo of the USS Louisiana (BB-19) leading President Theodore Roosevelt’s Great White Fleet as it approaches San Diego. The fleet’s 1907 to 1909 circumnavigation of the globe tested the adaptability of the officers who commanded the ships. Today’s officers face a similar inflection point.
From Coal-Fired Battleships to Algorithmic Warfare: The Enduring Demands of Surface Command
U.S. Naval Academy Class of 2026 Capstone Essay Contest Winners
Sponsored by the Class of 1945 in honor of Commander Earl Fannin
Category: Surface Warfare
By Ensign David Drake, U.S. Navy
June 2026
Proceedings
Vol. 152/6/1,480
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In 1907, President Theodore Roosevelt sent the Great White Fleet around the world as a demonstration of U.S. sea power. Yet, the voyage was more than a spectacle; it was a proving ground for naval leaders in a new technological age. The U.S. Navy was in transition, as officers learned to command in an era transformed by steel hulls, new propulsion systems, and industrialized warfare. The fleet’s circumnavigation tested not only the endurance of its ships, but also the adaptability of the officers who commanded them, forcing them to master global logistics, fleet coordination, and extended operations far from home. These challenges demanded a new kind of competence—one that combined technical mastery, logistical foresight, and diplomatic awareness.1 While technology transformed the tools of naval power, it did not reduce the burden on those entrusted with command. Today’s surface warfare officers (SWOs) stand at a comparable inflection point.
Historical Case Study: The Great White Fleet
The Great White Fleet provides a useful case study in how surface warfare leaders are tested during periods of rapid technological change. The 1907–9 circumnavigation was not merely an exercise in naval theater; it exposed the operational and logistical pressures that emerge when new technology expands capability faster than organizations can adapt.2 By examining what the voyage demanded of its officers—mastery of unfamiliar systems, sustained global operations, and decision-making under public and strategic scrutiny—we can identify leadership requirements that remain central to the surface warfare community. The Great White Fleet sailed at the intersection of strategic signaling and technological transition, and it revealed a pattern that repeats today: New tools increase reach and speed, and they also sharpen the consequences of human judgment.
Coal-powered propulsion presented one of the most immediate and complex challenges. Unlike sail-powered vessels, steamships depended on reliable access to fuel. The fleet had to coordinate with colliers and foreign ports to sustain its movement, forcing officers to plan operations with logistical precision. Fuel was no longer a passive enabler of movement but an operational dependency that directly shaped the fleet’s range, timing, and strategic flexibility. Commanding officers were forced to integrate energy logistics into operational decision-making, recognizing that the fleet’s ability to maneuver and project power depended on the security and availability of its fuel supply.
Mechanical reliability posed an additional burden. Steam engines, boilers, and auxiliary systems required constant maintenance, and failures could leave ships vulnerable or immobilized far from friendly support.3 Commanding officers were responsible not only for navigation and combat readiness, but also for managing the technical condition of complex industrial systems that were still new to naval service.
The voyage also tested officers’ abilities to operate as part of an integrated fleet.4 Although these ships operated in physical proximity, the challenge of synchronizing their actions foreshadowed a leadership burden that persists to the present: the requirement to integrate distributed capabilities into a coherent and effective fighting force.
Maintaining formation, coordinating movements across vast distances, and ensuring the readiness of multiple capital ships required disciplined leadership and professional competence.5 Officers were forced to integrate navigation, engineering, logistics, and personnel management into a unified operational framework. The global nature of the voyage further introduced diplomatic and strategic considerations.6 Beyond refueling, port visits in South America, Asia, and Europe were intended to signal U.S. power and professionalism. Officers understood their conduct reflected not only on their ships, but also on the credibility of the United States as a maritime power.
President Roosevelt viewed the fleet as both a strategic instrument and a proving ground for naval leadership. He recognized the effectiveness of modern warships depended on the officers who commanded them. Steam propulsion expanded the Navy’s reach, but it also increased the consequences of leaders’ decisions. The Great White Fleet’s successful circumnavigation demonstrated that ships’ officers could adapt to technological transformation while maintaining operational effectiveness.7 More important, it reinforced a fundamental truth that remains relevant: Technological advancement enhances naval power, but it does not diminish the responsibility borne by those entrusted with command.
The Information Age of Naval Warfare
Today, SWOs serve at a similar forefront of technological change. Autonomous surface vessels, artificial intelligence–enabled targeting systems, resilient networks, cyber operations, and distributed operations are reshaping naval warfare in ways that are as consequential as the transition from sail to steam.8 Warships no longer are merely platforms of steel and propulsion; they are nodes in a vast information network, generating, transmitting, and consuming large amounts of data in real time.9
In this environment, combat effectiveness depends not only on firepower, but also on cognitive advantage. U.S. Army General James Mingus and Major Zak Daker argue that “residing in the data layer saps momentum and invites defeat” and that success requires climbing the cognitive hierarchy toward greater understanding and decision-making advantage.10 Their warning is particularly relevant to the surface force. Modern ships are equipped with layered sensors, integrated combat systems, and automated decision aids.11 The challenge for SWOs is not merely accessing data, but also exercising disciplined judgment amid information abundance, discerning signals from noise, and retaining moral and tactical clarity under compressed timelines.
Distributed maritime operations further amplify this burden. Whereas the officers of the Great White Fleet coordinated ships operating in visual proximity, modern commanders may operate dispersed across hundreds of miles, connected through digital networks but required to make independent decisions with strategic consequences.12 Dispersion increases survivability, but it also increases accountability. A decision made by a single destroyer commander may carry operational and diplomatic implications far beyond the horizon.
Strategic signaling likewise has evolved. The Great White Fleet demonstrated U.S. sea power through deliberate physical presence on distant seas and in foreign ports. In 2026, the Navy operates under persistent global visibility, as do the officers who serve within it. The widespread use of social media for personal and professional applications has only magnified this visibility. Satellite imagery, real-time media reporting, and the digital information domain ensure the actions of the Navy and its sailors are observed, interpreted, and sometimes contested almost instantaneously.13 SWOs no longer signal credibility solely through port visits and formal diplomacy. They signal it through every maneuver, communication, and engagement that enters the global information environment. The challenge is no longer merely to demonstrate strength, but also to uphold a reputation continuously, even in moments of ambiguity and crisis.
The Burden of Command in a Networked Battlespace
Autonomous systems, algorithm-assisted targeting, and distributed command structures introduce operational advantages, but they also raise questions of responsibility. When decision-support systems recommend engagement based on machine-processed data, judgment is not assumed by the algorithm and abdicated by the officer. Officers must maintain the intellectual discipline and moral courage to question, verify, and, if necessary, override them.14
Distributed maritime operations intensify this reality. Dispersion empowers junior commanders with greater tactical independence, yet that independence carries strategic consequences. A single engagement decision made amid uncertainty, electronic warfare, and partial information may escalate beyond its immediate tactical context. SWOs today therefore must possess not only technical proficiency, but also prudence, acting decisively without acting recklessly. Roosevelt believed naval power required officers who embodied the “strenuous life,” embracing responsibility rather than deferring it.15 To this day, one of the core rites for Annapolis plebes remains memorizing Theodore Roosevelt’s “Man in the Arena” speech, which exemplifies the high levels of courage and ownership the United States expects of its naval officers. That principle remains unchanged.
The modern information environment further complicates ethical leadership. Naval operations unfold under persistent global scrutiny. Satellite imagery, real-time reporting, and adversary information campaigns ensure actions are detected, disseminated, and interpreted almost instantly. SWOs therefore must uphold professional standards not only in combat, but also in day-to-day conduct, recognizing credibility is a form of combat power. Character is not an abstract virtue; it is a strategic asset and force multiplier.
Ultimately, a significant ethical challenge facing SWOs is continuity amid change. Earlier ships demanded mastery of communication and logistics; today’s systems demand mastery of data and automation. Yet, in both eras, the decisive element remains the same: a human officer entrusted with lethal authority. The measure of professional excellence is not technological fluency alone, but today’s officers bear responsibility for decisions with consequences that extend beyond the deckplates. Honor in the surface force has never resided in machinery. It resides in those who command it.
The tools of naval warfare will continue to evolve—from coal bunkers to cognitive architectures—but the presence of officer command endures. From the decks of the Great White Fleet to the bridges of today’s advanced destroyers, the decisive element of naval warfare has not been machinery; it has always been character.
1. Robert A. Hart, The Great White Fleet: Its Voyage Around the World, 1907–1909 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1965), 23–25.
2. Naval History and Heritage Command (NHHC), “The Great White Fleet,” 3 January 2022, www.history.navy.mil/research/histories/ship-histories/the-great-white-fleet.html.
3. NHHC, “The Great White Fleet.”
4. Hart, The Great White Fleet, 23–25.
5. Warwick Brown, “When Dreams Confront Reality: Replenishment at Sea in the Era of Coal,” International Journal of Naval History 9, no. 1–3 (April-December 2010).
6. Craig L. Symonds, The U.S. Navy: A Concise History (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2015).
7. Hart, The Great White Fleet, 150–60.
8. Chief of Naval Operations, A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority 2.0 (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, December 2018), 7–8.
9. U.S. Department of the Navy, Advantage at Sea: Prevailing with Integrated All-Domain Naval Power (Washington, DC: U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, December 2020), 12–15.
10. GEN James Mingus and MAJ Zak Daker, USA, “Ascend the Cognitive Hierarchy—Don’t Waste Time in the Data Layer,” Modern War Institute at West Point, 10 February 2016.
11. Bryan Clark et al., Regaining the High Ground at Sea: Transforming the U.S. Navy’s Surface Fleet for Decision-Centric Warfare (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2018), 5–12.
12. Department of the Navy, Distributed Maritime Operations Concept (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 2020).
13. Thomas G. Mahnken, Competitive Strategies for the 21st Century: Theory, History, and Practice (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012), 145–50.
14. U.S. Department of Defense, DoD Directive 3000.09: Autonomy in Weapon Systems (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2012; updated 2023).
15. Theodore Roosevelt, “The Strenuous Life,” speech delivered in Chicago, 10 April 1899.